

**SUBMITTED TESTIMONY OF**

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**‘NATIONAL AND HOMELAND SECURITY:  
MEETING THE NEEDS’**

**HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE**  
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**Introduction**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for affording me an opportunity to address the President’s budgets for National and Homeland Security. I appreciate the chance to contribute to congressional deliberations about the adequacy of what is – and must be – our government’s highest priority in time of war: “Providing for the common defense.”

In general, I commend President Bush for allocating scarce federal resources to meeting the urgent needs of our military and homeland defenders. As you know, their budgets have been largely spared the deep cuts imposed on other, less vital programs. Instead, the Pentagon and Homeland Security Department are facing reductions in the previously projected growth in spending they would be allocated.

Unfortunately, the effect on the national security is still significant and deleterious. I would like to review briefly areas of special concern in the DoD and DHS budgets and close with a word about the related national security programs of the Department of Energy.

**The Department of Defense**

President Bush’s FY2006 budget, together with the supplemental request just submitted to the Congress, mostly – though not fully – meets the immediate requirements of the United States’ armed forces, and particularly those associated with the ongoing combat activity in Iraq and other fronts in the War on Terror. A far greater shortfall, however, is this budget’s failure adequately to prepare us to deal with major security threats that may present themselves in the next 5-10 years.

Specifically, the budget reflects a growing focus on sizing and equipping the military to contend with unconventional conflicts and terrorist insurgencies. (It remains to be seen whether this apparent bias will still be appropriate in the aftermath of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) now underway, which will – as I understand it – examine other possibilities, including that of the emerging threat from Communist China.)

Of particular concern in this regard is the prospect of cutting programs that are critical to America's future ability to project power as required to implement the national security policy Ronald Reagan dubbed "Peace through Strength." I will have a bit more to say in a moment about the continuing decline in the size of the U.S. Navy's blue-water fleet, the sharp decline in tactical aviation and airlift, and cuts in the vital missile defense program -- as well as their implications for the associated industrial bases.

A general observation is in order at this point, however: **Cutting money from defense programs essential to our ability to dominate the future battlespace against adversaries armed with sophisticated weapon systems, in the interest of making the military more responsive to lesser threats, is neither penny wise nor pound sensible.**

History teaches that such down-scaling of our capabilities merely emboldens prospective foes. Given the trends with respect to China -- notably, the cumulative effect of its massive investment in advanced armaments (an investment that may soon be made vastly more ominous if Europe begins supplying Beijing with weaponry) and the PRC's growing appetite for the world's finite oil and gas resources -- we face a serious prospect of future conflict with the Communist Chinese even without *encouraging* them to contemplate it.

To be sure, different types of conflicts can require different types of capabilities. Yet, the sorts of platforms that are the focus of most of the defense budget cuts -- an aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, F/A-22s, the V-22 Osprey and C-130s have in common an inherent flexibility that make them valuable investments in most scenarios currently in prospect.

As members of this Committee know all too well, much of the present problem is a result of fiscal constraints associated with this budget. While the desire to exercise spending discipline is understandable, and even *laudable* under other circumstances, I would respectfully suggest that it is ill-advised to engage in it at the expense of defense preparedness during wartime.

That is particularly true in light of the fact that the accounts being disproportionately reduced involve investments that have been long-overdue and already subjected to too much budgetary uncertainty. In addition, a number of the programs being cut are now at the point where the bulk of the investment has already been made and the return on that investment -- for example, in terms of aircraft procured -- can be obtained most cheaply.

## **Major Issues**

### **1. Our Shrinking Navy**

Improvements in the combat capabilities of U.S. Navy vessels, changes in the way they are manned and the deferral or elimination of some maintenance are said to allow cuts safely to be made to ship construction schedules and fleet size. The budget

request amounts to a \$1.7 billion cut in shipbuilding, and reduces the number of new ships to be built from six to just four in the current fiscal year.

This is happening even as the threat posed to America's capital ships grows inexorably. As **the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark USN**, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week:

**...We are...keeping a weather eye on increasing anti-access and sea denial capabilities being developed by other nations in the world, particularly in the Middle East and Asia.** The greatest challenge that we face in the Navy is this: What are the intentions of those nations who are displaying emergent investment patterns that could challenge the sea control that we currently possess that enables the United States military to operate freely around the globe?

Adm. Clark has testified that he is now contemplating a Navy that has as few as 260 ships. I respectfully submit that such a fleet would be unable to maintain the sort of presence and power projection capability we are likely to require around the world for the duration of the War on Terror. That is especially true if, as the foregoing quote makes clear, the Navy is going to be facing vastly more serious threats to its ships, "particularly, in the Middle East and Asia."

I share the concern expressed by others about the proposed early retirement of the conventionally powered aircraft carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy. While the Navy is to be commended for improvements it has made in the readiness and availability of carrier battlegroups (CVBGs), it is clear that eliminating the ship at the core of one of these units will make sustaining such schedules problematic. It will almost certainly result in leaving the Nation unable to respond as we may need to in the event of future acts of aggression, or acts of God. Worse yet, current funding projections suggest that the Navy may ultimately be reduced to as few as 9 CVBGs. Such unilateral disarmament is reckless in the face of the emerging challenges to our maritime power and interests.

Other cuts that will dramatically slow the builds of Navy blue-water combatants are no less troubling. Especially worrisome is the decline in the number of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) contemplated by a build-rate of just one-per-year for the foreseeable future. As I noted above, these vessels have proven to be among the most flexible platforms in the American arsenal – performing vital sea-control, intelligence-collection and land-attack functions, among others.

We often talk about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in terms of chemical, biological and nuclear arms. It has been observed, however, that extremely quiet, advanced-propulsion submarines should also be considered a type of WMD, insofar as they can be utilized with great effect to deliver the other kinds of such weapons. The best antidote we have to the world-wide proliferation of these submarines is a large and potent fleet of our own SSNs. At the low rate of production and with refueling overhauls being slipped, we risk being unable to counter the potent threat posed by prospective enemies' growing submarine warfare capabilities.

I hope that the Committee, as it weighs the adequacy of a 4-ship building plan for FY 2006, will consider endorsing an approach other federal departments have been allowed to use, but not the Department of Defense – namely, advanced appropriations. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the absence of such a practice, CBO scorekeeping has the effect of forcing the Navy to “pay” for each ship up front, even though payments for the construction of most are actually made over several years time. This practice is contributing to the current, grossly inadequate shipbuilding program.

## **2. Cuts in Aircraft Procurement**

Cuts to major aircraft programs in the FY06 budget request are financially unwise and come at a time when potential enemies are upgrading their air capabilities and defenses. I am particularly struck by the reduction in the number of F/A-22 Raptors being purchased, in light of the plane’s extraordinary performance and the prospect that it alone among America’s fighter/attack inventory may be able to establish and maintain air superiority over territories increasingly defended by advanced anti-aircraft missile systems.

A similar logic seems to be at work as with the Navy. Better performance, higher reliability and more cost-effective sustainability is said to justify cuts in the number of units procured. At some point, however, even vastly superior weapons can be overwhelmed by less capable ones. We are entering an era in which there will be many fighters far more advanced than those we designed in the 1970s, as well as fourth-generation air defenses, in unfriendly hands. If our objective is to *deter war* – not just prevail if it occurs – we must be capable of giving our troops not only unsurpassed equipment, but sufficient quantities of such gear, as well.

Unfortunately, the planned cuts will not only deny the Nation the least costly and most capable F/A-22s, i.e., those that would otherwise be purchased at the back-end of the production run. They will also cause the production line to shut down three years ahead of schedule – well before the fruits of the Joint Strike Fighter program are fully validated; the latter aircraft does not IOC until 2013.

I would be happy to discuss with the Committee my concerns about other reductions, including those that will cause a costly termination of the previously authorized C-130J multi-year procurement, stretch out production of the transformational V-22 Osprey, and defer planned modernizations of the Huey, Cobra and Super Stallion helicopter programs.

## **3. Missile Defense**

Mr. Chairman, I have long believed that it was irresponsible for the United States to choose deliberately to be vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Consequently, I commend President Bush and his national security team for taking the steps necessary to complete development and begin the deployment of anti-missile defenses.

Like other proponents of such a course of action, I am of course disappointed by the difficulties encountered in recent months in aspects of the Ground-Based Missile Defense test program. It is important to note that these difficulties appear to involve *quality control* issues associated with certain software and test interfaces, not a fundamental problem with the GBMD system itself, let alone the physics of missile defense.

Having said that, these persistent problems reinforce my conviction that the Nation needs near-term defense-in-depth against missile attack. For that reason, I am generally comfortable with the cuts proposed in the President's budget for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, a medium-term research and development effort, but **would urge a far more aggressive investment in sea-based anti-missile systems using the Navy's Aegis ships and full funding for the Airborne Laser program, coupled with accelerated funding for developing and fielding missile defenses where they will do the most good – in space.**

#### **4. Detrimental effect on the Industrial Base**

I have alluded above to the negative effects of the proposed cuts on the U.S. industrial base. In my experience, Members of Congress are generally well aware when jobs are jeopardized by programmatic slips or cancellations. My view has long been that the defense budget is not, and should not be viewed as, a jobs bill. If programs are not justified on their merits, spending should be applied to meet the military's many other, pressing needs.

There is, however, a real danger entailed in allowing the military's needs to be met through potentially unreliable off-shore sources. I commend the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Duncan Hunter, for the efforts he made in the 2005 Defense authorization bill aimed at addressing this challenge. While the various remedies he proposed were highly controversial and ultimately not included in the final version of that legislation, the problem he identified has certainly not gone away.

It is simply intolerable to contemplate American servicemen and women possibly being put at risk due to a foreign supplier's unwillingness or inability to provide needed components or spares in time of war. I urge the Congress to address this issue anew as part of its deliberations on the adequacy of this budget and the industrial base needed to support our armed forces and national security policy.

#### **The Department of Homeland Security**

As with the Defense Department's budget, real growth in proposed spending by DHS in FY2006 is commendable, but not sufficient to the tasks of securing our homeland. In the interest of brevity, permit me to offer but one example that illustrates the magnitude and complexity of the challenge in a time of terror and war – and the need for an even greater federal effort to meet it.

As I hope members of this Committee know, a blue-ribbon, congressionally mandated Commission recently conducted a detailed assessment of the effects of a nuclear attack on the United States involving the detonation high above the Nation of a ballistic missile-delivered weapon. The panel, which was charged with “assessing the threat to the United States from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack,” concluded that the EMP effects of such an attack at altitudes between 40 and 400 miles above this country could so severely disrupt, both directly and indirectly, electronics and electrical systems as to create a **“damage level...sufficient to be catastrophic to the Nation.”** Worse yet, the commission concluded that “our current vulnerability invites attack.” (The executive summary of this classified report can be viewed at <http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-22emp.pdf>)

It is not clear from a review of the Homeland Security Department’s budget what office, if any, would be responsible for responding to the EMP Threat Commission’s recommendations for urgent action to reduce our vulnerability to such an attack. This is a monumental undertaking, requiring shielding and other measures to mitigate disruptions and prevent extensive damage to systems upon which virtually every aspect of life in America depends today.

Failure to take such steps could mean that a single North Korean or Iranian missile, possibly launched from a ship off the coast of the United States, could instantly transform this country from an advanced 21<sup>st</sup> Century society to an 18<sup>th</sup> Century one. It is hard to imagine a more devastating form of terror than that entailed in the dislocation, hardship and destruction that would accompany an America returned to a pre-industrial state -- except now with its population crowded into cities that could not function.

Let me emphasize that this problem is not confined to the civilian economy. It applies as well to our military. Which brings me to a point that I hope you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues will address forthrightly in the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress.

### **Department of Energy National Security Programs**

One of the reasons this country is so vulnerable to EMP attack is that we largely stopped worrying about this phenomenon thirteen years ago. In 1992, the United States adopted a moratorium on nuclear testing, thus precluding the most rigorous and reliable means of establishing the susceptibility of electronic systems to electromagnetic effects.

The folly of foregoing such testing has only been compounded by the reality that our moratorium has also had very deleterious effects on our nuclear deterrent. For example, we no longer can be certain that the weapons in our arsenal will work as they are supposed to. We are reduced to relying on what amounts to informed scientific guesswork based on computer simulations. Guesses are no substitute for the certitude we need when it comes to such life-and-death matters.

One thing is certain: Our stockpile is not as safe and reliable as we could make it. Without realistic testing, we can only introduce changes in the components or designs of existing weapons at the risk of further degrading confidence they will work.

What is more, we are unable to introduce new designs that would be better suited to countering threats posed by countries like Iran and North Korea than the hugely destructive weapons developed more than twenty years ago to counter targets in the Soviet Union.

Worst of all, these costs have been incurred for no good reason. Neither North Korea nor Iran have, as far as we know, conducted nuclear tests on their way to joining the “nuclear club.” Consequently, it is now indisputable that the United States’ foreswearing underground testing has not had the promised effect -- impeding proliferation.

In an important analysis published recently by the Center for Security Policy ([http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/A\\_Different\\_Approach.pdf](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/A_Different_Approach.pdf)), **Vice Admiral Robert Monroe USN (Ret.)**, a former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, argues persuasively that **if we are to have any hope of preventing proliferation in the future, the United States must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent – and undertake the associated testing, developmental and industrial actions.**

I regret to inform you that **a leading Republican member of this House – Rep. David Hobson, Chairman of the House Energy and Water Resources Appropriations Subcommittee**, has played a decisive and highly counterproductive role by working to prevent the Department of Energy from making virtually any progress in these areas. I very much hope that this Committee, and others concerned with the adequacy of the measures being taken to provide for the Nation’s security will ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Program and associated activities – including assessing our vulnerability to EMP – are funded, along with the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, to “meet the needs.”

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.